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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-1127 
____________ 
 
KAREN E. TUCKER, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-12-cv-05900) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 28, 2014 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 7, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Dr. Karen Tucker appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing 
her complaint.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
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 In 1998, Dr. Tucker pleaded guilty to one count of Medicare fraud, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1347, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.  
See Tucker v. United States, 2001 WL 1613796 (N.D. Tex. December 13, 2001) 
(denying section 2255 motion to vacate sentence).  During this same time period, she 
sought reimbursement from Medicare for services allegedly rendered to Medicare 
beneficiaries.  In May, 2007, Dr. Tucker filed a civil complaint pro se in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, requesting payment of certain claims that 
had been denied.  The Secretary of the United States Department of Health & Human 
Services moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. 
Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1), arguing that Dr. Tucker had failed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies.  Specifically, the Secretary argued that Dr. Tucker never submitted timely 
requests for payment on some of her claims, and did not timely prosecute the vast 
majority of her claims through the entirety of the administrative appeals process.  In 
opposition to the motion to dismiss, Dr. Tucker argued that she was prevented from 
submitting claims and appellate documentation to Medicare by a United States 
Magistrate’s pretrial release order, issued on March 24, 1998, which made her subject to 
the condition that she avoid all contact with anyone who might be a witness in her case, 
including any health care providers, doctors, nursing homes, Medicare personnel, and 
patients.   
 The District Court granted the Secretary’s motion and dismissed Dr. Tucker’s 
complaint.  The District Court concluded that Dr. Tucker arguably satisfied the 
jurisdictional “presentment” requirement, but further concluded that it was beyond 
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dispute that she had not fully exhausted her administrative remedies because she did not 
timely prosecute her claims through the entirety of the administrative appeals process or 
timely file certain of her claims.  See Tucker v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 2761525, at *9 
(D.N.J. July 12, 2010) (“[T]he Court concludes that waiver of the exhaustion requirement 
is not warranted in this case, and that consequently the … Court lacks jurisdiction over 
Dr. Tucker’s Complaint and will dismiss it.”).1  Dr. Tucker then sought reconsideration, 
asking the District Court to waive the exhaustion requirement.  In an order entered on 
July 25, 2011, the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration.  See Tucker v. 
Sebelius, 2011 WL 3047651 (D.N.J. July 25, 2011). 
 Dr. Tucker appealed, but we concluded that the District Court properly declined to 
waive exhaustion and properly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  See Tucker v. Sec’y, Health & Human Serv., 487 F. App’x 52 (3d Cir. 
2012).  We noted that Dr. Tucker raised no constitutional arguments or issues collateral 
to her claims for payment, but rather argued that the government had impeded her from 
exhausting her remedies, see id. at 56.
2
  We were not persuaded by this argument and 
                                              
1
 A district court has jurisdiction over an appeal taken from a final, reviewable decision 
of the Secretary made after a hearing in a Medicare case.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  Without 
that final, reviewable decision, however, there is no subject matter jurisdiction in the 
district courts.  See Fitzgerald v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 232, 234 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976)).  There are two prerequisites to § 405(g) 
jurisdiction: the nonwaivable jurisdictional requirement that a claim for benefits shall 
have been presented to the Secretary, and the waivable requirement that administrative 
remedies be exhausted.  See Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 111 n.14 (1984). 
2
 A claim is “collateral” if it is not essentially a claim for benefits.  See Fitzgerald, 148 
F.3d at 234. 
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agreed with the District Court that Dr. Tucker had the ability to submit the missing 
documentation to Medicare, see id. at 56-57. 
 Dr. Tucker then filed a second complaint in federal district court, again seeking 
payment for the very same Medicare claims that were the basis for her prior complaint.  
Seizing upon our prior determination that she had not raised any constitutional or 
collateral issues, Dr. Tucker asserted jurisdiction based on alleged violations of her 
constitutional rights and several federal statutes.  Dr. Tucker also sought to vacate her 
conviction for Medicare fraud.  The Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing in pertinent part that the District 
Court’s prior judgment had a preclusive effect on, and barred, the new complaint.   
 The District Court rejected the Secretary’s issue preclusion argument and 
dismissed the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim for relief, Fed. R. Civ. 
Pro. 12(b)(6), see Tucker v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 6054552 (D.N.J. November 15, 2013).  
Among other determinations, the District Court discussed Dr. Tucker’s claims in light of 
review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and noted that waiver of exhaustion might be 
warranted if she had raised a colorable constitutional argument.  However, despite her 
claims that her Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been 
violated, her complaint failed to articulate a basis for such claims.  Although she 
mentioned “due process” several times in her complaint, her prior civil action established 
without a doubt that she had had a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the 
administrative level.  The District Court concluded that in her current complaint Dr. 
Tucker was merely reiterating the same arguments but calling them constitutional 
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violations.  Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction was still lacking.  See id. at *12 
(“The Court has examined the complaint for any allegations implicating constitutional 
rights that were missing from her prior complaint, but has found none.”).  The District 
Court also held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Dr. Tucker’s conviction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
3
  Dr. Tucker later filed a post-judgment motion, which the District 
Court treated as a motion for reconsideration, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(e), and denied. 
 Tucker appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The Secretary has 
argued in her brief on appeal that Dr. Tucker’s second complaint should have been 
dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because the District Court’s prior judgment had a preclusive effect on, and barred, the 
second complaint.  The District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged at 
any time, including on appeal.  See In re: Kaiser Group International Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 
565 (3d Cir. 2005).  We have stated that we have a “special obligation” to satisfy 
ourselves not only of our own jurisdiction, but also that of the District Court in a cause 
under review.  See Wujick v. Dale & Dale, Inc., 43 F.3d 790, 792 (3d Cir. 1994).  See 
also Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 322 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Questions of 
original jurisdiction are always automatically before this Court on appellate review.”). 
                                              
3
 The Secretary has advised us that Dr. Tucker pursued a petition for writ of error coram 
nobis in the federal district court in Texas because she is no longer in custody for 
purposes of section 2255 jurisdiction.  The petition was denied and her appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was unsuccessful.  See Appellee’s 
Brief, at 3-4.  We agree with the District Court that there is no basis for Dr. Tucker to 
challenge her conviction in the federal district court in New Jersey.   
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 We will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint on the basis of 
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We agree with the Secretary that the District Court’s 
prior judgment dismissing Dr. Tucker’s first complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction had a preclusive effect on, and barred, the second complaint.  A judgment 
dismissing an action for lack of jurisdiction ordinarily has no preclusive effect on the 
cause of action originally raised, but it does have a preclusive effect on matters actually 
litigated.  See Kasap v. Folger Nolan Fleming and Douglas, Inc., 166 F.3d 1243, 1248 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“even a case dismissed without prejudice has preclusive effect on the 
jurisdictional issue litigated”).  The issue of the District Court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction was actually litigated in Dr. Tucker’s first cause of action.  Dismissal of the 
prior suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction thus barred relitigation of  the 
jurisdictional question.  See Hill v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(although dismissal is without prejudice because court did not have power to decide case 
on the merits, it is preclusive with respect to jurisdictional ruling that plaintiff failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies).  There is abundant case law applying the doctrine of 
issue preclusion to subject matter jurisdictional decisions.
4
 
                                              
4
 See, e.g., Muñiz Cortes v. Intermedics, Inc., 229 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2000) (dismissal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “precludes relitigation of issues determined in 
ruling on the jurisdictional question”); North Georgia Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of 
Calhoun, 989 F.2d 429, 432-33 (11th Cir. 1993) (dismissal of complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction adjudicates court’s jurisdiction, and second complaint cannot command 
second consideration of same jurisdictional claim); Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 
1189, 1194 (2d Cir. 1983) (although appellate court in affirming dismissal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction did so “without prejudice,” this statement did not defeat effect 
of judgment with respect to issue preclusion on issues of jurisdiction); Oglala Sioux Tribe 
of Pine Ridge Indian Reservation v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1411-1413 
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 None of Dr. Tucker’s new theories of relief involving violations of federal statutes 
or her constitutional rights correct the jurisdictional problem.  As the District Court 
correctly noted, in her second complaint she was merely reiterating the same arguments 
but calling them constitutional violations.  Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction was 
still lacking.  Dr. Tucker fully availed herself of the opportunity to establish subject 
matter jurisdiction in her first cause of action.  See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348 
(1948) ( “[T]here is nothing in the concept of due process which demands that a 
defendant be afforded a second opportunity to litigate the existence of jurisdictional 
facts.”).  Dr. Tucker failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and nothing has 
changed to undermine that determination. 
 Furthermore, section 405(h) of title 42 provides that section 405(g) is the only 
remedy for a party seeking review of a decision under the Medicare Act denying a 
monetary benefit.  See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Health Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 
1, 10 (2000).  The federal statutes cited by Dr. Tucker provide no basis for the District 
Court to have assumed jurisdiction over her claims.  In addition, to the extent that Dr. 
Tucker sought to pursue a civil rights action against Secretary Kathleen Sebelius pursuant 
to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the 
                                                                                                                                                  
(8th Cir. 1983) (dismissal of suit for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction precludes 
relitigation of same issue of subject matter jurisdiction in second federal suit on same 
claim); Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (same).  Cf. 
Semtek Intern. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (dismissal of state 
court claim by federal court sitting in diversity barred plaintiff from refiling same claim 
in that same court, but did not necessarily bar plaintiff from filing claim in state court). 
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action.  See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).  The United States may 
not be sued without its consent, see id., and a Bivens action cannot be maintained against 
a federal official in her official capacity since such an action would essentially be one 
against the United States.  Last, the District Court’s denial of Dr. Tucker’s motion for 
reconsideration was not an abuse of discretion. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
the complaint. 
